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Abstract Over the period 1995–2006 the Spanish economy experienced a rapid
increase in employment and output growth, a surge in investment over GDP, a sub-
stantial deterioration in the current account balance and an improvement in the finances
of the social security system. This paper presents a dynamic general equilibriummodel
designed to quantify the role played by immigration in shaping these facts. In the con-
text of the aging of the Spanish population, we also analyze the medium and long run
effects of the immigration process accounting for relevant supply and demand effects.
This is done by allowing for enough heterogeneity in the demographic characteristics
of immigrant and native workers in a way that allow us to perform counterfactual
experiments regarding the flow of immigrants and its skill composition.
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1 Introduction
Immigration flows into Western Europe accelerated since the early 1990s. There is
a significant body of empirical literature regarding the impact of immigration on the
host country, but most of it refer to Anglo-Saxon countries. Since there are reasons to
believe that the effects of immigration may vary across countries, depending upon the
demographic characteristics of the immigrants and of the native workers and the func-
tioning of the labourmarket, the demand for economic analysis and empirical evidence
on the economic effects of immigration in other recipient countries has significantly
increased.
Broadly speaking, the quantitative studies of the impact of immigration on the
host country can be grouped into two categories: (i) microeconometric studies of the
impact of immigrants on the labour market performance of the native workers, and (ii)
macroeconomic studies based on the calibration of some general equilibrium models
that, typically, incorporate some parameters estimated by microeconometric studies.1
Two examples of this second category are Canova and Ravn (2000) and Storesletten
(2001). Both cases are closed economy frameworks inwhich all prices are endogenous
and consequently the possible impact of immigration on the evolution of the current
account cannot be addressed. Since one of our aims is to quantify the role of observed
immigration flows in shaping the recent evolution of the current account in Spain, we
have to stick to an open economy setup.
Among allWestern European countries, Spain, traditionally an out-migration coun-
try, has been, by far, the largest recipient of immigrants: foreign population residing in
Spain, 0.35 millions (1% of total population) in 1995, went up to 4.1 millions (around
10% of total population) in 2006. This immigration boom has expanded both aggre-
gate supply and aggregate demand and plausibly altered the functioning of the Spanish
labour market.2 Hence, immigration has probably had significant aggregate effects.
First, there are the demographic effects of immigration. Western European coun-
tries are going through a demographic transition with significant population ageing.
Although demographic ageing is not a new phenomenon, it has now assumed unprece-
dented proportions owing to the post-war baby boom, and the baby bust that followed.
One extreme case is Spain, where the aging of the baby boom generation and the
very low levels of the fertility rates, e.g. 1.17 and 1.2 in 1995 and 2000 respectively,
are expected to increase the ratio of the elderly (65 and older) over the total popu-
lation from 16.96% in 2004 to 35.6% by 2050.3 As the age structure of immigrants
is in general younger than that of the host population, there is a popular belief that a
more generous immigration policy can increase the working-age population and help
to reduce the pension burden of the elderly by 2030–2055 which is when the large
cohorts born in the 60s and 70s in Spain will be retired.
1 Examples of the first category are, for instance, Card (2001), Borjas (1999), and Ottaviano and Peri
(2006).
2 Some previous studies on several economic effects of inward migration flows to Spain are Aparicio and
Tornos (2000), Collado et al. (2004), Oficina Económica del Presidente (2006) and Catalunya (2006).
3 These figures come from Eurostat Demographic Statistics 1996.
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Secondly, there are the effects of immigration on the labour market. These
immigration flows, not only imply a huge labour supply shock, also alter the skill
composition of the labour force and the functioning of the labour market. For instance,
immigrant workers are typically regarded as a production factor that substitutes low
skilled native workers, while it is complementary of both physical capital and high
skilled native workers. Also, as their bargaining power at wage setting is plausibly
lower, their wages, after controlling for observable characteristics, are typically lower.
Thirdly, there are the effects of immigration on productivity and long-run growth.
Since the mid-1990s, labor productivity growth has significantly fallen in some
European countries and, most noticeably, in Spain.4 Since immigrants are typically
employed in labour intensive sectors with below average productivity, part of the
decline of labour productivity growth is the result of a transitory negative composition
effect. However, depending on assimilation patterns of immigrants, the size of future
immigration flows and their skill composition, this effect on productivity growth could
be more lasting.
The computation of these aggregate effects of immigration5 requires the use of
a general equilibrium model capable of accounting for all the relevant supply and
demand effects of immigration. In this paper we use a large overlapping generations
model, calibrated to the Spanish economy, to perform such an exercise.6 Given the
lack of microeconomic studies on the impact of immigration into Spain, we start from
the basic specification of this type of models, trying to achieve sufficient flexibility to
enrich the model as more empirical evidence becomes available. In this respect, our
approach takes as given the age, fertility and skill characteristics of current immigrants
in Spain. We consider an initial steady state characterized by the age structure of the
Spanish population in 1995 and study the effects of several immigration scenarios on
several macroeconomic variables (GDP, employment, productivity, etc.).
Our main results show that: (i) immigration caused a rise of the employment rate
through its impacts on the age structure of the population and on the aggregate partic-
ipation rates (immigrants were younger and had higher participation rates), (ii) immi-
gration had a significant negative effect on productivity, duemainly to the occupational
composition of immigrants’ employment, (iii) overall, the effect of immigration on
GDP per capita was positive, but not large, (iv) immigration also led to a rise in the
aggregate investment rate, while the impact on the saving rate was less significant, and
(v) plausible immigration scenarios in the forthcoming years cannot avoid a signifi-
cant rise in pension expenditures and a noticeable worsening in the financial situation
of the Social Security system.
The structure of the paper is standard. Sections 2 and 3 describe, respectively, the
model and the calibration strategy; Sect. 4 presents the findings and Sect. 5 contains
some concluding remarks and hints at several research lines that could contribute to
enrich the model in the future.
4 See Jimeno et al. (2006).
5 We abstract from returned migration. See Ortega (2007) for an analysis of the political support for
unskilled immigration under permanent and temporary scenarios.
6 Similar approaches are Rojas (2005) and Diaz-Gimenez and Diaz-Saavedra (2009).
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2 The model
2.1 Demographics
The economy is populated by agents that live a maximum of I periods. Each agent
is indexed by age i , time t , type j and native status n. The index n represents the
age of an individual when entering the country, consequently a native has n = 1 and
an immigrant is indexed by n ≥ 2. Depending on occupation j they can be more
or less productive and we allow for different occupational distributions for natives
and immigrants and hence, we define ω j,n as the probability of having productivity
j conditional on being a native n = 1 or immigrant n ≥ 2. Upon arrival at the age
of i ≥ IA an agent starts taking decisions. Each individual is endowed with 1 unit
of time that can be allocated to work or leisure up to age IR−1. After this age agents
retire. Each agent faces an age dependent probability of surviving between age i and
age i + 1 at t denoted by si,t . Then the unconditional probability of reaching age i for
an individual that has age v at t is π iv,t =
∏i
k=v+1 sk−1,t+k−v−1 with πvv,t = 1.
The population age groups of native individuals within each occupation (which is
constant through time), i.e. those with subindex n = 1 are those who survive from the
previous period according to the age specific survival probability specified before,
Ni+1,t+1, j,n = si,t Ni,t, j,n if n = 1. (1)
On the other hand, new immigrants moves according to the following law of motion.
Those who just enter the country in a given period are sorted into occupations, repre-
sented by the index j , according to the probability ω j,n , then
Ni+1,t+1, j,n = ω j,n I Ni+1,t+1 if i + 1 = n (2)
where I Ni+1,t+1 denotes the number of new immigrants at time t + 1 with age i + 1.
Once immigrants are in the host country, their age groups evolve according to the
survival probability as in the case of natives
Ni+1,t+1, j,n = si,t Ni,t, j,n if i + 1 > n. (3)
Regardless the native status, all individuals are assumed to reproduce according to
an age specific fertility rate represented by bi,t .Therefore, individuals in the first age
group are the children of all individuals in the economy (immigrants and natives) plus
the immigrants that enter the country with age 1, or equivalently









Ni,t, j,nbi,t + I N1,t+1
⎞
⎠ . (4)
Finally, total population POPt , the share of age-i and type- j–n individuals over the
total population at time t μi,t, j,n and the gross population growth rate are defined as
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μi,t, j,n = Ni,t, j,n
POPt
(6)




At each point in time agents are assumed to maximize lifetime utility. The problem of
the typical agent that at t has age i = v (v ≥ IA) is to choose consumption and leisure




β i−vπ iv,tU (ci,t+i−v, j,n, hi,t+i−v, j,n). (8)
Let define labor income net of taxes as
yi,t, j,n = wtφi,t, j,nei, j,nhi,t, j,n(1 − τl,t − τss). (9)
where ei, j,n is the efficiency index, wt is the hourly wage per efficiency unit, φi,t, j,n is
the age specific employment rate, the social security proportional tax and the propor-
tional labor income tax are respectively τss,t and τl,t and di,t, j,n are the social security
benefits. Then, the maximization is subject to the period-by-period budget constraint
which in the case of a working household (i < IR) is
ai+1,t+1, j,n = (1 + rt (1 − τk))(ai,t, j,n + Bt ) + yi,t, j,n − ci,t, j,n (10)
and in the case of a retired household (i ≥ IR) is
ai+1,t+1, j,n = (1 + rt (1 − τk))(ai,t, j,n + Bt ) + di,t, j,n − ci,t, j,n (11)
with a1,t, j,n = 0, aI+1,t, j,n = 0. The discount parameter is β, and is assumed to be
the same for all agents. Borrowing is possible and agents accumulate asset holdings to
smooth consumption over time. rt is the interest rate net of depreciation, ai+1,t+1, j,n
denotes next period asset holdings and τk is a proportional capital income tax. Notice
that since borrowing is possible, the formulation of the budget constraint implies that
government subsidizes interest payments on debt, which is a way to capture the fact
that in the Spanish tax code, mortgage interests are tax-deductible. Finally, Bt is the
accidental bequest received at t .
123
414 SERIEs (2010) 1:409–432
The specific utility function of the household is
u(c, h) = c
1−σ
i,t, j,n
1 − σ − φi,t, j,n H
h1+μi,t, j,n
1 + μ . (12)
Notice that we are implicitly assuming that at each point in time only a proportion
φi,t, j,n of householdmembers are employed, but its members choose consumption and
labor (of those who are employed) so as to maximize joint utility under the assumption
that employed and non-employed members enjoy the same consumption allocation. In
this case, the intertemporal and intratemporal first order conditions of the household
are respectively
c−σi,t, j,n = βsi,t (1 + rt (1 − τk))c−σi+1,t+1, j,n (13)
Hhμi,t, j,n = wtφi,t, j,nei, j,n(1 − τl,t − τss)c−σi,t, j,n . (14)
2.3 Production technology
Production in period t is given by a standard constant returns to scale production func-
tion that converts capital Kt and labor Nt into output. The technology Zt improves
over time at a constant rate because of labor augmenting technological change accord-
ing to Zt+1 = (1+λ)Zt . Competitive firms rent labor and make investment decisions
taking into account the existence of adjustment costs to investment








These adjustment costs are used among others in Christiano et al. (2005) and Burnside
et al. (2004), and are by now standard in dynamic general equilibrium models. These
costs penalize large changes in investment, and are typically used in order to dampen
the reaction of investment to different shocks. In our set up, these costs have been
expressed over the growth rate of the economy in the initial steady state γss = (1 +
λ) (1+npss) so that in this initial situation those are zero. To see that, notice that after
removing the effect of productivity growth (1+λ) and population growth (1+ np), the
ratio between this period and the past period investment is ItIt−1 = IˆtIˆt−1 (1+λ)(1+npss),
and since in the initial steady state Iˆt = Iˆt−1, then ItIt−1 = (1+λ)(1+npss).
Firms act so as to maximize the present value of current and future cash flows using
the discount factor 11+r j where r j is the exogenous interest rate. At period t cash flows
are given by
Dt = F(Kt , Zt Nt ) − C AD Jt − wt Nt − It . (16)
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Then formally, the problem solved by firms is








1 + r j
)
[F(Ks, Zs Ns) − C AD Js − ws Ns − Is]
(17)
subject to
Is = Ks+1 − (1 − δ)Ks ∀s ≥ t (18)
The problem’s first order conditions with respect to Ns, Ks+1 and Is , ∀s ≥ t are
respectively
F ′N (Ks, Zs Ns) = ws (19)






























The government levies a proportional social security tax on labor income τss,t to
finance a benefit di,t, j,n per retiree









where λ, rep, wav and Pmax are the productivity growth, the legal replacement rate,
some average of past earnings and the maximum pension benefit respectively. From
age IR + 1 to I , the pension benefit is normalized by productivity growth (1 + λ),
since new pensions are greater than old ones, i.e. di,t, j,n = di−1,t, j,n1+λ
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The government also levies a τk and τl,t to finance per capita government consump-























μi,t, j,ndi,t, j,n + Gt . (23)
2.4.1 The equilibrium
A Competitive Equilibrium is a list of sequences of quantities ci,t, j,n , hi,t, j,n , ai,t, j,n ,
μi,t, j,n , di,t, j,n , Nt , Kt , prices wt , qt , rt , social security tax rates τss,t and income tax
rates such that, at each point in time t :
1. firms maximize profits
2. agents maximize lifetime utility subject to the period budget constraints taking as
given wages, the interest rate, taxes, social security benefits, survival probabilities,
the age structure of the population and accidental bequests,
3. the age structure of the population {μi,t, j,n} follows the aggregate law of motions






















μi,t, j,nφi,t, j,nei, j,nhi,t, j,n (25)








μi,t, j,nai,t, j,n (26)
and FAt be the net foreign asset position, then the following holds
F At+1 = At+1 − Vt (27)
where as indicated in the problem of the firm Vt refers to the value of the firm,
which is equal to the discounted sum of future profits starting on date t + 1.
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7. the budget constraint of the government is satisfied period by period
8. and the good market clearing condition is satisfied
F(Kt , Zt Nt ) = Ct + It + C AD Jt + Gt + F At+1 − (1 + rt )F At (28)
where the current account is the variation of net foreign assets (C At = F At+1 −
F At ), and the trade balance is the variation of net foreign minus income from these
assets (T Bt = C At − rt F At ).
3 Calibration
3.1 Demographics
Each model period corresponds to 1 year. Agents reach adulthood at 16 and live up to
age 100, after which death is certain. We take the age structure of the population of
1995 as the initial condition in order to propagate the population to the future. In that
year, the stock of immigrants represented 1% of the total population. This number and
the fact that there is no data set available in order to know when existing immigrants
entered the country, lead us to make no distinction between immigrants and natives in
the initial steady state. In order to obtain the initial asset distribution we are implicitly
assuming that individuals living in the initial steady state think that the population will
not change.
After 1995, given the dynamics of fertility and the mortality, we propagate the age
structure of the population until it becomes stationary (in the sense that the share of
each age group over the total population does not change through time) under several
scenarios about the immigration flows.7
3.1.1 Immigration flows
Our baseline scenario takes the reported number of new immigrants in the Labour
Force Survey (Encuesta de Poblacion Activa) which increases from 33,060 in 1996 to
507,500 in 2005, and from 2006 to 2050 the number of inflows decreases until it settles
around 270,000 immigrants per year.8 The age distribution of these migration flows
are taken to be constant and are computed as follows. The available data refers only
to age groups of 10 years, and almost 80% of the new immigrants enter the country
with less than 40 years of age. Since in our model a period is 1 year, for computational
reasons, we have assumed that there are 40 possible ages at which immigrants can
enter the country. Furthermore, the proportion of new immigrants to each age group
has been obtained by fitting a second order polynomial to the current age distribution
of new immigrants in Spain (see first panel of Fig. 1). Finally, these immigrants are
assumed to have the same mortality and fertility rate as natives.
7 Fertility and mortality rates are obtained from the demographic projections (scenario 1) of the Instituto
Nacional de Estadística.
8 These figures are contemplated in the high-immigration scenario of themost recent demographics forecast
of the Spanish National Statistics Office.
123
418 SERIEs (2010) 1:409–432
3.1.2 Heterogeneity
In order to properly account for the potential differences in productivity between
natives and immigrants and make alternative experiments concerning the skills con-
tent of immigration flows, we have partitioned individuals of the same generation into
four possible occupations (qualified non-manual, non-qualified non-manual, qualified
manual and non-qualified manual). The distribution of natives and immigrants work-
ers by these occupational levels comes from the Structural Earnings Survey (SES)
in 2002, since information about the nationality of the worker was not available in
the 1995 wave of this survey. However, according to the information available in
the Spanish Labour Force Survey (LFS), the distribution by occupation of immigrant
workers has remained roughly constant over this period. As can be seen in Fig. 1, it is
important to take into account differences in the occupational distribution of workers
by nationality given that immigrants are more concentrated than natives in low-skilled
occupations.We assume that new immigrants entering the country until 2050maintain
this occupational distribution.














































Fig. 1 aAgedistribution of immigration flows.bOccupation distribution. cAgedistribution of productivity
natives. d Age profile of employment rates
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Regarding productivity, we allow productivity differentials across age, nationality
and occupational level. As the information about productivity at the individual level
is not available, we proxy productivity differentials by wage differentials using, as
previously, information from SES in 2002. We compute hourly wages by age groups,
nationality and occupational level (see Fig. 1). It should be noticed that in the highest
occupational level we assume that the wage differential is zero between natives and
immigrants.9
Finally, individuals, natives and immigrants, are assumed to get employed with a
probability equal to the employment rate of their age group. On average, immigrants
present a higher employment rate than natives but this gap is mainly due to they are
younger, so it is important to take into account age differences. Indeed, as can be
seen in Fig. 1, immigrants show slightly lower employment rate for each age group
except those less than 25 years. Employment rates are computed using Labour Force
Survey data for 2005. We use more recent information for employment rates in order
to take into account that new immigrants entering Spain since 1995 have showed
higher employment rates than the few immigrants who where already here at that
date. We think this is more adequate in order to extrapolate employment rates for new
immigrants until 2050.
3.2 Preferences, production and the world interest rate
As mentioned before the period utility function of the household is
u(c, h) = c
1−σ
i,t, j,n
1 − σ − φi,t, j,n H
h1+μi,t, j,n
1 + μ (29)
where the inverse of the elasticity of substitution σ is 1.5. The parameters μ and H
has been set such that the average time spent working is around 1/3 and the Frisch
elasticity of labor (1/μ) is 0.4. Hence we use H = 500 and μ = 2.5.
The production technology is Cobb-Douglas
Yt = F(Kt , Zt Nt ) = K αt (Zt Nt )1−α (30)
and the capital share parameter is α = 0.375 following the estimates of Diaz-Gimenez
and Diaz-Saavedra (2009) for the Spanish economy. The productivity growth has been
set to λ = 1% in annual terms which is the average growth of per-capita consump-
tion over the period 1960–1995. The adjustment cost parameter is consistent with the
estimates of Christiano et al. (2005) and is equal to χ=3.
Finally, the depreciation rate of capital δ, the international real interest rate and
the discount factor parameter β are chosen simultaneously to reproduce the following
three targets in 1995: (1) An average ratio of gross investment over output I/Y=21.7%,
(2) a ratio of foreign assets over GDP of around −20% and (3) a capital output ratio
9 Since there are very few observations of immigrants in this occupational level, available data give implau-
sible estimates of wage differentials.
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Table 1 Current account in the model versus Spain
Data 1995 Model 1995
Current account/GDP (%) −0.3 −0.44
Net foreign assets/GDP (%) −20 −20
of 2.9. The value of the parameters that satisfies these conditions are δ = 5.5%,
β = 0.9983 and r = 7.7%. It should be noted that in the initial steady state of the
model economy the current account deficit over GDP ratio is slightly more negative
that the one observed in the data, due to the fact that the model is assumed to be in a
steady state, while this is not necessarily the case in the data (Table 1).
3.3 Government
Pension benefits are as follows. Upon retirement an individual’s pension is computed
applying a replacement rate over the average of earnings of the last 15 years before
retirement. This replacement rate is, 0% if an individual has been contributing for less
than 15 years, 100% if he has contributed for at least 35 years, and 60 + 2(m − 15)
in percent terms if the individual has contributed at least 15 years but less than 35,
where m is the number of contributed years (Table 2). The pension system in Spain
also includes a maximum and a minimum pension level equal to 1.85 and 0.44 times
the per-capita output in the Spanish economy in 1995. However in the model economy
these limits were not binding, due to the fact that we have considered broad quali-
fication’s categories. The social security contribution rate is set by computing total
Table 2 Calibration
Parameters Targets (1995)
σ = 1.5 Kotlikoff’s estimation
μ = 2.5 Frisch elasticity around 0.4
H = 500 1/3 of the time working
φi,t,k,n (see Fig. 1) Age profile of employment rates in Spain
α = 0.375 Diaz-Gimenez and Diaz-Saavedra (2009)
λ = 1% Average growth rate % consumption
χ = 3 Christiano et al. (2005) estimate
r = 7.7% FA/GDP = −20% in 1995
β = 0.9983 K/Y = 2.9 in 1995
δ = 5.5% I/GDP = 21.7% in 1995
G = 0.18 ∗ G D P Government consumption in 1995
τk = 0.186 Bosca et al. (1999)
τss = 17.87% Ratio of social security contributions
over labor income
Pension rules in Spain
rep = 0 if n < 15
rep = 60+20 (n − 15)
if 35 > n > 15
rep = 100 if n > 35
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contributions to the system (which amounted to 39,050.02 millions of euros in 1995)
as percentage of labor income in 1995 (218,493 millions of euros), and yields 17.87%.
Notice that we are not imposing (as many papers do) the social security system to be
balanced. We use a value of the capital income tax τk = 0.186 as reported by Bosca
et al. (1999) and set a government to output ratio of G/Y = 18% which is the ratio
of government consumption to GDP in 1995 in Spain. The labor tax rate τl,t is set
endogenously to balance the overall (including the social security system) government
budget. In the initial steady state the value that satisfies this condition is 22.04%. It
should be noted that the labor taxwill be changing over time as a result of (among other
things) possible imbalances between social security contributions and expenditures.
In the initial steady state, the above rules generate a ratio of pension expenditure and
social security surplus over GDP of 10.6 and 0.45%.
3.4 Computation method
The computational procedure used to solve for the transitional dynamics of the model
follows Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). Notice that since the economy undergoes a
transition in which conditions change over time and economic agents are assumed to
take into account future prices in determining their behavior, it is necessary to solve
simultaneously for the equilibrium in all transition years. In order to implement the
computational procedurewe assume that the final steady state is reached in 1000model
periods, and have checked that it was not binding. The main steps of the algorithm are
the following.
A. Given initial conditions K1and {{ai,t, j,n}Ii=IA }t=1 and the exogenous sequence of
the the age structure of the population {μi,t, j,n} and the interest rate {rt }t=1000t=1 , pro-
vide a guess for the path of the price {qt }t=1000t=1 , future investment {It+1}t=999t=1 and
the age profile of work effort {{hi,t, j,n}I r−1i=IA }t=1000t=1 ∀ j, n.Then proceed as follows:
• Using {{hi,t, j,n}I r−1i=IA }t=1000t=1 compute aggregate labor {Nt }t=1000t=1• Using Eq. (21), compute a new sequence of current investment decisions
{It }t=999t=1 given past and the guessed future investment decisions• Then use the law of motion (18) to compute a sequence of next period capitals
{Kt+1}t=999t=1 .
• Using {Kt }t=1000t=1 , {Nt }t=1000t=1 and themarginal productivity condition (19), com-
pute wages {wt }t=1000t=1
• Using {{hi,t, j,n}I r−1i=IA }t=1000t=1 ∀ j, n.and wages {wt }, compute pension benefits to
which agents qualify {{di,t, j,n}Ii=IR }t=1000t=1
• Using the arbitrage condition (20), obtain a new sequence of {qt }t=1000t=1• Using the inter-temporal first order conditions of households (13), its budget
constraints, the path for the interest rate, wages, transfers, and labor efforts
{{hi,t, j,n}I r−1i=IA }t=1000t=1 , solve for optimal consumption {ci,t, j,n}t=1000t=1 ∀i, j, n and
asset holdings {ai+1,t+1, j,n}t=999t=1 ∀i, j, n.
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• Use the computed sequence {ci,t, j,n}t=1000t=1 ∀i, j, n and the intra-temporal first
order condition of the household problem (14) to compute a new guess of the
age profile of work effort {{hi,t, j,n}I r−1i=IA }t=1000t=1 .
B. If the new sequences, {qt }t=1000t=1 , {It }t=1000t=1 and {{hi,t, j,n}I r−1i=IA }t=1000t=1 are equal to
the guesses of step (A) the algorithm is stopped. If not, update the guesses and go
back to step (A).
4 Findings
In order to analyze the aggregate effects of immigration, we compute the evolution of
macroeconomic variables under several scenarios that vary in respect to the size and
composition of the immigration flows. We start computing a baseline scenario char-
acterized by two main features: (i) the population ages according to the demographic
projections specified in the calibration, including the current immigration flows, and
(ii) there is a fall in the international interest rate. In particular we assume that between
1995 and 2005 real interest rate falls by 1.5% points, as observed in the Spanish econ-
omy during this period, and then increases until reaching a level consistent with a
long term decline of 1% point. This expected long-term decline in the real interest
rate is consistent with results from recent papers that have addressed the impact of
demographics on the evolution of international real interest rate.10 Since the model is
calibrated for 1995 and, in the baseline scenario we use factual immigration flows for
the period 1996–2005, from comparison with observed data we can evaluate to what
extent the model is able to predict the impact of immigration over the short-run. In
addition, to disentangle the aggregate effects of immigration from the effects of the
change in the interest rate, we consider four alternative scenarios combining different
paths for immigration flows an the real interest rate. In particular, we have computed
five alternative cases:
• Scenario 1 (baseline): Observed immigration flows and a fall in the international
interest rate
• Scenario 2: No immigration and a fall in the interest rate
• Scenario 3: No immigration and a constant interest rate
• Scenario 4: An increase in immigration of unskilled workers and a fall in the interest
rate
• Scenario 5: Immigration flows as in the baseline scenario, more skilled immigrants
and a fall in the interest rate.
4.1 The aggregate effects of observed immigration flows
In order to gauge the aggregate effects of immigration flows into the Spanish economy,
we present the results of the baseline scenario in comparison to the case of no migra-
tion flows (Scenarios 1 and 2). To present the results we use several graphs, plotting
the evolution of some labor market variables (wages, employment, and labor supply),
10 See, for instance, Kara and von Thadden (2006) and Krueger and Ludwig (2006).
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Table 3 Comparing the model and the data
Data (%) Model (%)
Immigration No immigration
1995 2005 1995 2005 2005
Current Acc./GDP −0.33 −7.4 −0.44 −6.9 −2.85
Investment/GDP 21.8 29.53 21.6 29.59 25.41
Pensions/GDP 8.54 7.82 10.6 10.1 11.09
2000–2005 2000–2005 2000–2005
% GDP growth 2.11 2.22 2.18
% Employment growth 1.70 1.03 0.26
Productivity growth 0.40 1.17 1.92
Table 4 Results
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Employment per capita (%)
1995 31.99 31.99 31.99 31.99 31.99
2005 35.22 33.39 33.39 35.25 35.22
2020 35.83 30.79 30.79 37.69 35.83
2050 31.64 24.99 24.99 35.59 31.64
GDP per employee (detrended)
1995 53.04 53.04 53.04 53.04 53.04
2005 53.86 56.60 54.52 54.05 55.45
2020 54.47 60.17 55.68 52.62 60.58
2050 51.30 56.58 53.04 48.84 60.47
GDP per capita (detrended)
1995 16.97 16.97 16.97 16.97 16.97
2005 18.97 18.90 18.21 19.05 19.53
2020 19.52 18.53 17.14 19.83 21.71
2050 16.23 14.14 13.25 17.38 19.13
Investment/GDP (%)
1995 21.56 21.56 21.56 21.56 21.56
2005 29.60 25.42 19.68 30.86 31.12
2020 20.56 16.61 15.22 23.37 22.07
2050 21.11 18.49 16.45 22.78 20.70
some macroeconomic variables (the capital labor-ratio, GDP per capita, investment
and saving rates, and the current account balance—bcc-), and some variables reflect-
ing the situation of the pension system (the dependency ratio—the ratio of retirees to
the labor force-, pensions expenditures, and the Social Security deficit).11 We evaluate
the short-run performance of the model by comparing the results for 2005 with the
observed data (Table 3), and the medium term results for some selected years which
are reported in Table 4. For this case the results are in Figs. 2 and 3.
11 Wages, GDP per employee, and GDP per capita are detrended.
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Pension Deficit over GDP
Fig. 2 Dashed lines: Scenario 1, solid lines: Scenario 2
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Fig. 3 Taxes and life-cycle behaviour of natives. Dashed lines: Scenario 1, solid lines: Scenario 2 (no
immigration)
In the short term, the findings are the following. Immigration contributed both to
the rise in employment per capita and to the decline of labor productivity (measured as
GDP over employment). Both effects tend to cancel out and, as a result, GDP per capita
turns out to be very similar in both scenarios over the initial periods of the transition,
although it increases with immigration afterwards. Overall, the model replicates quite
well the evolution of GDP per capita, whose average annual rate of growth over the
2000–2005 has been 2.11% (2.2% in the model under the baseline [1]). Admittedly,
over this period the model produces a lower rate of growth of employment per capita
(1.03% annual) and a higher rate of growth of labour productivity (1.17% annual) than
observed (1.70 and 0.40%, respectively).
Another front where the model comes very close to replicate the observed data over
this period is regarding the evolution of investment: the investment rate increased from
21.8% in 1995 to 29.53% in the data while in the model economy it increased from
21.6% of GDP to 29.59%. In fact, the investment rate is substantially higher in the
experiment with immigration flows as compared to the case without immigration. The
reason is that, with immigration, the lower capital labor ratio increases the marginal
productivity of capital and increases the profitability of investment decisions. As a
by product of these trends, and having into account that over the short term there is
not much difference between both scenarios in terms of the behavior of the saving
rate, the model with immigration flows deliver an evolution of the current account
deficit as percentage of GDP which is more in line with the data, as compared to the
no-immigration scenario. In addition, the model with immigration is able to account
for the reduction in the percentage of GDP spent on pensions (Table 3).
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From the comparison between the first two scenarios in the medium term, we draw
the following conclusions. Without immigration flows (Scenario 2), the aging of the
baby boom generation increases more substantially the number of the retirees over the
total population inducing an more pronounced increase in the labor tax rate in order
to balance the government budget. In addition, although over the initial periods there
is some reduction in the percentage of GDP spent on pensions and the social security
deficit in the scenario with immigration flows, this does not impede that both pension
expenditures and the Social Security deficit surges to much higher levels that the cur-
rent ones. However, the inflow of immigrants alleviates, to some extent, the effects of
the aging of the baby-boom generation and generates substantial differences in terms
of the distortionary effects of taxes (see Fig. 3). This different behavior of the labor
tax is what induces substantial changes at the individual level. To further understand
how immigration affects agents decisions, we have compared the life-cycle behavior
of the average native individual that starts taking decisions in 1996 which is the year
of the migration shock. It should also be noted, that since the evolution of wages at the
aggregate level is fairly similar in the model economies with and without immigration,
the most important driver of after-tax earnings at the individual level is the different
evolution of the labor tax needed to balance the government budget. In terms of con-
sumption allocations, in Scenario 2 (without immigration) the higher tax rates and the
lower life-cycle after-tax earnings implies that native individuals attain a lower level
of consumption through the life-cycle. In addition, the higher level of labor taxes that
characterizes the scenario without immigration gives native individuals incentives to
substitute hours worked when old by labor effort in the early ages of the life-cycle, in
an attempt to avoid tax distortions. Hence, in order to attain the desired consumption
profile, in the scenario without immigration individuals will work harder when young
and save the extra resources to finance consumption when old, which is when the labor
taxes are higher. This process is illustrated in Fig. 3.
As for other aggregate effects (see columns [1] and [2] of Table 4), these are spe-
cially noticeable in the case of employment per capita (about 2, 5 and 8 pp higher
at 2005, 2020 and 2050 in Scenario 1). This is due to two effects: (i) the continuous
immigrant flows of the order of those considered in Scenario 1 imply significantly
less population ageing than under no migration, and (ii) the weight of immigrants,
who have higher employment rates, in the labor force increases. For a similar compo-
sition effect, GDP per employee is significantly lower due to immigration, and also
the impact accumulates over time. As for GDP per capita, the effect of immigration,
as already commented, is minor but increases over time (0.37, 5.3, and 15% higher in
Scenario 1 in 2005, 2020 and 2050, respectively). Finally, the impact of immigration
on the investment rate is significant: about 4 pp higher at the three horizons presented
in Table 4 (diminishing over time due to the existence of investment adjustment costs).
4.2 The combined effects of immigration and of the fall in the interest rate
Now we compare Scenario 1 to Scenario 3 (characterized by no immigration and
a constant interest rate). This comparison, together with the results in the previous
section, allows us to draw some conclusions about the interaction between the effects
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of immigration and the fall of the interest rate. The main qualitative difference is, that,
under a constant interest rate there is a smaller increase in the stock of capital, due to
the higher cost associated with investment. Hence, there is a lower increase in GDP per
capita. The increase in the investment rate and the fall in the saving rate over the initial
periods of the transition, associated to the fall in the interest rate disappear (Fig. 4),
and, consequently, the current account balance displays a surplus in the initial periods
of the transition. In terms of the evolution of social security finances, the fall of the
interest rate is not very relevant, as the most important factor determining pension
expenditures and the Social Security deficit is the dependency ratio, which do not
change in the three Scenarios considered so far. More generally, we can gauge quanti-
tatively how important the effect of the postulated variations of the interest rate could
be, by looking at columns [2] and [3] of Table 4. The reduction of 1.5 pp of the real
interest rate over the 1995–2005 embedded in Scenario 2 does not affect very much
to either employment, productivity or GDP per capita over the short-run. However,
as accumulation of capital is larger than under Scenario 3, at longer horizons labor
productivity and, consequently, GDP per capita rise.
4.3 The effects of more unskilled immigration
In this case, we compare the baseline scenario, which is constructed on the observed
and predicted flows by the Spanish National Statistics Office, with an alternative sce-
nario in which immigration flows are permanently higher, at the level of 600,000
immigrants per year (Scenario 4). Regarding the skill distribution of these flows we
keep that observed under the baseline scenario, i.e. the one observed in the Spanish
economy in the recent period. While it is very unlikely that immigration flows of this
order of magnitude can be sustained over such a long period of time, this comparison
can give us some intuition on how the returns of immigration depend on the size of
the flows. In this case, the number of immigrants arriving at Spain over the 2000–
2050 period is twice the number of immigrants than under Scenario [1]. As a result,
employment per capita would be higher (only slightly over the short and medium run
and more noticeably at the 2050 horizon) but at the cost of a substantial deterioration
of labor productivity (see Fig. 5). Still, larger immigration flows would result in an
increase of GDP per capita of a small magnitude. With more immigration, the supply
of labor increases, and for the reasons explained before, the investment rate would
be also higher, without observing any significant change in the saving rate. Conse-
quently, the current account deficit would suffer an additional deterioration. On the
benefit side, the dependency ratio increases less importantly since the population ages
less quickly, and the expected increase in the percentage of GDP spent on pensions
would be less pronounced.
4.4 The effects of an upgrade in the skill content of immigration
Finally, we now keep the immigration flows of the baseline scenario but consider an
alternative skill distribution more biased towards high skill occupations as shown in
Table 5.
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Pension Deficit over GDP
Fig. 4 Dashed lines: Scenario 1, solid lines: Scenario 3
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Pension Deficit over GDP
Fig. 5 Dashed lines: Scenario 1, solid lines: Scenario 4
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Table 5 Occupation distribution of immigrants
Non-manual Manual
Skilled (%) Unskilled (%) Skilled (%) Unskilled (%)
Scenario 1 18 19.3 31.5 31.2
Scenario 5 70 10 10 10
As can be seen in Fig. 6 and columns [1] and [5] of Table 4, the most significant
effects are to be found in the evolution ofGDPper employee. Since in the two scenarios
immigration flows are of the same order of magnitude and in our model employment
rates of immigrant only vary by age (and not by occupation), the skill upgrade immi-
gration has no effects on employment per capita. However, GDP per capita increases
noticeably (by 2.9, 11.2 and 18%, respectively, at 2005, 2020 and 2050) as a result of
a more favorable evolution of labor productivity, which is also impulsed by a larger
accumulation of capital.
5 Concluding remarks
We have performed several accounting exercises to gauge the aggregate effects of
immigration under different conditions, regarding the evolution of interest rates and
the skill composition of immigration flows. For that, we have used a dynamic, general
equilibrium, overlapping generations model calibrated to the Spanish economy, using
as a baseline scenario the demographic projections currently envisaged by the Span-
ish National Statistics Office. This is a rather stylized model that does not account for
several facts, well-documented in microeconometric studies on the effects of immi-
gration in other countries but not yet in Spain, such as different preferences between
immigrants and natives regarding the consumption-leisure choice, the imperfect sub-
stitution in production between immigrants and natives, the impact of immigrants
on the employment rate and productivity of native workers, and the assimilation and
return patterns of immigrants. Despite these drawbacks, to be amended asmoremicro-
economic empirical evidence on the Spanish economy becomes available, the results
provide some interesting insights on the magnitude of the effects of immigration on
employment, productivity, GDP per capita, investment and saving rates, and the finan-
cial position of the pension system.
Themain conclusions from these exercises are the following. Immigration increases
employment through a positive impact on the age structure of the population and a com-
position effect (coming from higher observed employment rates of the immigrants),
but it has a significant negative effect on productivity, so that, overall, its impact on
GDP per capita, although positive, is not large. This negative effect on productivity
could be avoided with a skill upgrade of the composition of immigrant flows. There
are also important effects of immigration on the investment rate, while the impact
on the saving rate is less significant. Finally, none of the immigration scenarios con-
templated in this exercise, whatever is size or composition, avoid a significant rise
in pension expenditures and a noticeable worsening in the financial situation of the
Social Security system.
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Pension Deficit over GDP
Fig. 6 Dashed lines: Scenario 1, solid lines: Scenario 5
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